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Abstract
Timely and reliable detection of abrupt anomalies, e.g., faults, intrusions/attacks, is crucial for real-time monitoring and security
of many modern systems such as the smart grid and the Internet of Things (IoT) networks that produce high-dimensional data.
With this goal, we propose effective and scalable algorithms for real-time anomaly detection in high-dimensional settings. Our
proposed algorithms are nonparametric (model-free) as both the nominal and anomalous multivariate data distributions are assumed
to be unknown. We extract useful univariate summary statistics and perform the anomaly detection task in a single-dimensional
space. We model anomalies as persistent outliers and propose to detect them via a cumulative sum (CUSUM)-like algorithm. In
case the observed data stream has a low intrinsic dimensionality, we find a low-dimensional submanifold in which the nominal
data are embedded and then evaluate whether the sequentially acquired data persistently deviate from the nominal submanifold.
Further, in the general case, we determine an acceptance region for nominal data via the Geometric Entropy Minimization (GEM)
method and then evaluate whether the sequentially observed data persistently fall outside the acceptance region. We provide
an asymptotic lower bound on the average false alarm period of the proposed CUSUM-like algorithm. Moreover, we provide
a sufficient condition to asymptotically guarantee that the decision statistic of the proposed algorithm does not diverge in the
absence of anomalies. Numerical studies illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes in quick and accurate detection of
changes/anomalies in a variety of high-dimensional settings.
Index Terms
High-dimensional data, summary statistic, Geometric Entropy Minimization (GEM), principal component analysis (PCA), real-time
anomaly detection, nonparametric, cumulative sum (CUSUM).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Anomaly refers to deviation from the expected (regular) behavior. Anomaly detection has been widely studied and to name
a few, many distance-based, density-based, subspace-based, support vector machine (SVM)-based, neural networks-based, and
information theoretic anomaly detection techniques have been proposed in the literature in a variety of application domains
such as intrusion detection in computer and communication networks, credit card fraud detection, industrial damage detection,
etc. [1]–[3]. Early and accurate detection of anomalies has a critical importance for safe and reliable operation of many modern
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2systems such as the power networks (smart grid) and the Internet of Things (IoT) networks that produce high-dimensional data
streams. Such sudden anomalies often correspond to changes in the underlying statistical properties of the observed processes.
To detect the changes, the framework of quickest detection [4], [5] is quite suitable, where the statistical inference about the
monitored process is typically done through observations acquired sequentially over time and the goal is to detect the changes
as soon as possible after they occur while limiting the risk of false alarm.
The well-known quickest detection algorithms require the exact knowledge or estimates of the probability density functions
(pdfs) of the observed data stream for both the pre- and post-change cases [4], [5]. On the other hand, in high-dimensional
settings, e.g., large-scale complex networks that consist of large number of nodes that exhibit complex interactions, it is usually
difficult to model or intractable to estimate the high-dimensional multivariate pdfs. Moreover, it is, in general, quite difficult
to model all possible types of anomalies. Hence, in a general anomaly detection problem, the post-change (anomalous) pdf is
totally unknown. To overcome such difficulties, we propose to extract useful univariate summary statistics from the observed
high-dimensional data and perform the anomaly detection task in a single-dimensional space, through which we also aim
to make more efficient use of limited computational resources and to speed up the algorithms, that is especially required in
time-sensitive online settings.
Although a summary statistic may not completely characterize a random process, it can be useful to evaluate the non-
similarity between random processes with different statistical properties. In our problem, there are two main challenges to
determine good summary statistics: (i) summary statistics should be well informative to (statistically) distinguish anomalous
data from nominal (non-anomalous) data, (ii) since we are in an online setting, computation of the summary statistics should
be simple to allow for real-time processing. In this paper, we consider two alternative summary statistics: (i) if the observed
nominal data has a low intrinsic dimensionality, firstly finding a representative low-dimensional submanifold in which the
nominal data are embedded and then computing a statistic that shows how much the incoming data stream deviates from
the nominal submanifold; (ii) in the general case, determining an acceptance region for the nominal data via the Geometric
Entropy Minimization (GEM) method [6], [7] and then computing a nearest neighbor (NN) statistic that shows how much the
incoming data stream is away from the acceptance region. We propose to firstly compute a set of nominal summary statistics
that constitute the baseline in an offline phase and then monitor possible deviations of online summary statistics from the
baseline statistics.
Anomaly detection schemes based on parametric models are vulnerable to model mismatch that limits their applicability.
For instance, it is common to fit a Gaussian or Gaussian mixture model to the observed data or the data after dimensionality
reduction [1], [2], [8], [9] and to assume Gaussian noise or residual terms, see e.g., [10]. Such parametric approaches are
powerful only if the observed data perfectly matches with the presumed model. On the other hand, nonparametric data-driven
techniques are robust to the data model mismatch, that results in wider applicability of such techniques in a variety of problems.
Moreover, in practical high-dimensional settings, the lack of parametric models is common and complicated parameter-laden
algorithms generally result in low performance, over-fitting, and bias towards particular anomaly types [11]. Hence, in this
paper, we do not make parametric model assumptions for the observed high-dimensional data stream nor for the extracted
summary statistics.
3Conventional anomaly detection schemes ignore the temporal relation between anomalous data points and make sample-by-
sample decisions [1], [2]. Such schemes are essentially outlier detectors that are vulnerable to false alarms since it is possible
to observe non-persistent random outliers in a normal system operation (no anomaly) due to e.g., heavy-tailed random noise
processes. On the other hand, if a system produces persistent outliers, then this may indicate an actual anomaly. Hence, we
define an anomaly as persistent outliers and from the observed data stream, we propose to accumulate statistical evidence for
anomaly over time, similarly to the accumulation of log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) in the well-known cumulative sum (CUSUM)
algorithm for change detection [Sec. 2.2] [5]. With the goal of making a reliable decision, we declare an anomaly only if we
have a strong evidence for that. The sequential decision making based on the accumulated evidence also enables the detection
of small but persistent changes, that would be missed by outlier detectors.
B. Related Work
Batch algorithms are widely encountered in the anomaly detection literature [1], [2], that require the entire data before
processing. Clearly, such techniques are not suitable in the online settings. For instance, in [12], [13], via the principal
component analysis (PCA), the data are decomposed into normal and anomalous components and the data points with large
anomalous components are classified as anomalous. The well-known nonparametric statistical tests such as the Kolmogrov-
Smirnov test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and the Pearson’s chi-squared test are also mainly designed for batch processing.
Although several sliding window-based versions of them have been proposed for online anomaly detection, see e.g., [14], [15],
the window-based approach has an inherent detection latency caused by the window size. More importantly, such tests are
primarily designed for univariate data, with no direct extensions for multivariate data.
Various online anomaly detection techniques for multivariate data streams have also been proposed in the literature. The
SVM-based one-class classification algorithms in [16], [17] determine a decision region for nominal data after mapping the data
onto a kernel space, where there is no clear control mechanism on the false alarm rate. Moreover, the choice and complexity
of computing the kernel functions are among the disadvantages of such algorithms. A similar algorithm is presented in [18]
where the training data might contain a small number of anomalous data points or outliers. An extension of the one-class SVM
algorithm [16] is proposed in [19] where the objective is to detect anomalies in the presence of multiple classes. Furthermore,
in [6], [7], [20], NN graph-based anomaly detection schemes are proposed with sample-by-sample decisions. As discussed
earlier, the sequential decision making is more effective and reliable compared to the sample-by-sample decisions. In [21], an
online sliding window-based detector is proposed based on NN graphs, where after each observation, a new NN graph needs
to be formed, that is prohibitive in terms of computational complexity for real-time processing. In [22]–[24], two-sample tests
are proposed to evaluate whether two datasets have the same distribution, where the test statistics are the distance between
the means of the two samples mapped into a kernel space in [22] and the relative entropy, i.e., the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence, between the two samples in [23], [24]. Such approaches mainly suffer from low time resolution since they need
large sample sizes for reliable decisions. More recently, in [25], a new interpretation of the CUSUM algorithm based on
the discrepancy theory and the GEM method are presented to detect anomalies in real-time, where the proposed detector
asymptotically achieves the CUSUM algorithm under certain conditions.
4C. Contributions
In this paper, we propose real-time nonparametric anomaly detection schemes for high-dimensional data streams. We list
our main contributions as follows:
• We propose to extract easy-to-compute univariate summary statistics from the observed high-dimensional data streams,
where the summary statistics are useful to distinguish anomalous data from nominal data. We do not impose any restrictive
model assumptions for both the observed high-dimensional data stream and the extracted summary statistics. Hence, the
proposed schemes are completely nonparametric.
• We propose a low-complexity CUSUM-like real-time anomaly detection algorithm that makes use of the summary statistics.
• We provide an asymptotic lower bound on the average false alarm period of the proposed algorithm, where the bound
can be controlled by choosing the significance level for outliers and the decision threshold of the proposed algorithm.
• We provide a sufficient condition to (asymptotically) prevent false alarms due to divergence of the decision statistic of
the proposed algorithm in the absence of anomalies.
D. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the problem description and our solution approach in Sec. II,
derivations of the univariate summary statistics in Sec. III, and the proposed real-time anomaly detection schemes in Sec. IV.
We then evaluate the proposed schemes in different application settings via simulations in Sec. V. Finally, Sec. VI concludes
the paper. Throughout the paper, boldface letters denote vectors and matrices, all vectors are column vectors, and ·T denotes
the transpose operator.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND SOLUTION APPROACH
A. Problem Description
Suppose that we monitor a system that produces a high-dimensional stationary data stream, where at each time t we observe
a new data point xt ∈ Rp where p  1 is the dimensionality of the original data space, also called the ambient dimension,
and the data points are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. Suppose that an abrupt anomaly, e.g., an
unfriendly intervention (attack/intrusion) or an unexpected failure, happens at an unknown time τ , called the change-point,
and continues thereafter. That is, the system is under normal operating conditions up to time τ and the system’s underlying
statistical properties suddenly change at τ due to an anomaly. Denoting the pdfs of xt under normal (pre-change) and anomalous
(post-change) conditions as fx0 and f
x
1 6= fx0 , respectively, we have
xt ∼

fx0 , if t < τ
fx1 , if t ≥ τ.
Our goal is to detect changes (anomalies) with minimal possible delays and also with minimal rates of false alarm for a
secure and reliable operation of the observed system. In other words, we aim to detect the changes as quickly as possible
after they occur. The framework of quickest detection well matches with this purpose. A well-known problem formulation in
5the quickest detection framework is the minimax problem proposed by Lorden [26]. In the minimax problem, the goal is to
minimize the worst-case detection delay subject to false alarm constraints. More specifically, let Γ denote the stopping time at
which a change is declared and Eτ denote the expectation measure if the change happens at time τ . The Lorden’s worst-case
average detection delay is given by
J(Γ) , sup
τ
ess sup
Fτ
Eτ
[
(Γ− τ)+ |Fτ
]
,
where (·)+ = max{0, ·} and Fτ is the history of observations up to the change-point τ . J(Γ) is called the worst-case delay since
it is computed based on the least favorable change-point and the least favorable history of observations up to the change-point.
The minimax problem can then be written as follows:
inf
Γ
J(Γ) subject to E∞[Γ] ≥ β, (1)
where E∞[Γ] is the average false alarm period, i.e., the average stopping time when no change occurs at all (τ =∞), and β
is the desired lower bound on the average false alarm period.
If both fx0 and f
x
1 are known, then the well-known CUSUM algorithm is the optimal solution to the minimax problem given
in (1) [27]. Let
`t , log
(
fx1 (xt)
fx0 (xt)
)
denote the LLR at time t. In the CUSUM algorithm, the LLR is considered as a statistical evidence for change and the LLRs
are accumulated over time. If the accumulated evidence exceeds a predefined threshold, then a change is declared. Denoting
the CUSUM decision statistic at time t by gt and the decision threshold by h, the CUSUM algorithm is given by
Γ = inf{t : gt ≥ h},
gt = max{0, gt−1 + `t}, (2)
where g0 = 0.
Since it is practically difficult to model all types of anomalies, fx1 needs to be assumed unknown for a general anomaly
detection problem. In that case, if only fx0 is known and also has a parametric form, slight deviations from the parameters of f
x
0
can be detected using a generalized CUSUM algorithm [5, Sec. 5.3], [15], [28]. However, in a general high-dimensional problem,
it might be difficult to model or estimate the high-dimensional multivariate nominal pdf fx0 . Hence, in this study, we assume
that both fx0 and f
x
1 are unknown. We propose to use an alternative technique in that we extract useful univariate summary
statistics from the observed high-dimensional data stream and perform the anomaly detection task in a single-dimensional
space based on the extracted summary statistics, as detailed below.
B. Proposed Solution Approach
Firstly, we assume that there is an available set of nominal data points X , {xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, that are free of anomaly.
Practically, this is, in general, possible since the monitored system produces a data point at each sampling instant and a set
6of nominal data points can be obtained under normal system operation (no anomaly). Using X , we aim to extract univariate
baseline statistics that summarize the normal system operation such that the summary statistics corresponding to anomalous
data deviate from the baseline statistics. To this end, summary statistics should be well informative to distinguish anomalous
conditions from the normal operating conditions.
Let the summary statistic corresponding to xt be denoted by dt. Since the statistical properties of xt changes at time τ ,
we assume that the statistical properties of dt also changes at τ . Denoting the nominal and anomalous pdfs of dt as fd0 and
fd1 6= fd0 , respectively, we then have
dt ∼

fd0 , if t < τ
fd1 , if t ≥ τ,
where we assume that fd0 and f
d
1 are both unknown. Nonetheless, extracting a set of nominal summary statistics from X and
using this set as i.i.d. realizations of the nominal pdf fd0 , we can form an empirical distribution function (edf) of the nominal
summary statistics that estimates the nominal cumulative distribution function (cdf) F d0 of dt. Then, based on the nominal edf
of the summary statistics, for an incoming data point xt at time t and its corresponding summary statistic dt, we can estimate
the corresponding tail probability (p-value), denoted with pt. In statistical outlier detection, a data point xt is considered as
an outlier with respect to the level of α if its p-value is less than α, i.e., pt < α. Let
st , log
(
α
pt
)
. (3)
Then, for an outlier xt, we have st > 0 and similarly, for a non-outlier xt, we have st ≤ 0.
Under normal system operation, we may observe random non-persistent outliers due to e.g., high-level random system noise.
However, if a system produces persistent outliers, then this may indicate an actual anomaly. Hence, we can model anomalies
as persistent outliers. Considering st in (3) as a positive/negative statistical evidence for anomaly at time t, we can accumulate
st’s over time and obtain an accumulated evidence for anomaly. We can then declare an anomaly only if we have a strong
(reliable) evidence supporting an anomaly. This gives rise to the following CUSUM-like anomaly detection algorithm where
we replace the LLR `t in the CUSUM algorithm (see (2)) with st:
Γ = inf{t : gt ≥ h},
gt = max{0, gt−1 + st}, (4)
where g0 = 0.
In the following section, we present derivations of the proposed summary statistics. Then, in Sec. IV, we explain the
estimation of the tail probability pt (and hence st) based on the nominal summary statistics, that results in the final proposed
detection algorithm.
7III. SUMMARY STATISTICS
In this section, we firstly explain our methodology to derive summary statistics for a general high-dimensional data stream.
We then explain the derivation of summary statistics in a specific case where the data exhibits a low intrinsic dimensionality.
A. GEM-based Summary Statistics
Given a set of nominal data points X and a chosen significance level of α, the GEM method [6] determines an acceptance
region A for the nominal data based on the asymptotic theory of random Euclidean graphs such that if a data point falls outside
A, it is considered as an outlier with respect to the level α, otherwise considered as a non-outlier. The GEM method is based
on the NN statistics that capture the local interactions between data points governed by the underlying statistical properties of
the observed data stream.
A computationally efficient GEM method presented in [7] is based on bipartite kNN graphs (BP-GEM). In this method,
firstly X is uniformly randomly partitioned into two subsets S1 and S2 with sizes N1 and N2 = N −N1, respectively. Then,
for each data point xj ∈ S2, the kNNs of xj among the set S1 are determined. Denoting the Euclidean distance of xj to its
ith NN in S1 by ej(i), the sum of distances of xj to its kNNs can be written as follows:
dj ,
k∑
i=1
ej(i). (5)
After computing {dj : xj ∈ S2}, dj’s are sorted in ascending order and the (1 − α) fraction of xj’s in S2 corresponding to
the smallest (1− α) fraction of dj’s form the acceptance region A. Then, for a new data point xt, if its sum of distances to
its kNNs among S1, denoted with dt, is greater than the smallest (1− α) fraction of dj’s, i.e.,∑
xj∈S2 11{dt > dj}
N2
> 1− α,
then xt is considered as an outlier with respect to the level of α, where 11{·} is an indicator function.
Let δ(·) be the Lebesgue measure in Rp. As k/N1 → 0 and k,N2 → ∞, the acceptance region A determined by the
BP-GEM method almost surely converges to the minimum volume set of level α [7], given by
Λα , min
{
δ(A) :
∫
z∈A
fx0 (z)dz ≥ 1− α
}
,
where δ(A) denotes the volume of A. Moreover, if fx0 is a Lebesgue density, the minimum volume set and the minimum
Rényi entropy set are equivalent [7]. Hence, the BP-GEM method asymptotically achieves the minimum entropy set, i.e., the
most compact acceptance region for the nominal data.
If xt is an outlier, then it falls outside the acceptance region A, i.e., the corresponding NN statistic dt takes a higher value
compared to non-outliers. Moreover, if the observed data stream persistently fall outside the acceptance region, or equivalently
if we persistently observe high NN statistics over time, then this may indicate an anomaly. Hence, we can use the GEM-based
NN statistic as a summary statistic to distinguish anomalous data from nominal data. Moreover, we can use {dj : xj ∈ S2} as
a set of GEM-based nominal summary statistics.
8A salient feature of extracting summary statistics based on the BP-GEM method is that with the incoming data points in an
online setting, there is no need to recompute the NN graph for the entire dataset. This is because for each data point, either
newly acquired or belonging to the set S2, the NNs are always searched among the time-invariant set S1. Hence, obtaining new
data does not alter the NNs of the points in S2. In the online phase, the main computational complexity is then searching the
NNs of incoming data points among the set S1. To further reduce the complexity, fast NN search algorithms can be employed
to approximately determine the NNs, see e.g., [29].
Finally, since we capture local interactions between data points via their kNNs, k should not be chosen too large. On the
other hand, since the set S1 might contain some outliers, an incoming data point might fall geometrically close to a few of
such outliers. Then, k should not be chosen too small in order to reduce the risk of evaluating an outlier or anomalous data
point as a non-outlier. Therefore, a moderate k value might best fit to our purpose of extracting useful GEM-based summary
statistics for anomaly detection.
B. Summary Statistics for High-Dimensional Data Exhibiting Low Intrinsic Dimensionality
In many practical applications, observed high-dimensional data exhibits a sparse structure so that the intrinsic dimensionality
of the data is lower than the ambient dimension, and hence the data can be well represented in a lower-dimensional subspace.
In such cases, we can model the data as follows:
xt = yt + rt, (6)
where yt is the representation of xt in a submanifold and rt is the residual term, i.e., the departure of xt from the submanifold,
mostly consisting of noise.
Suppose that we learn a submanifold that the nominal data are embedded in. Since the learned manifold is mainly
representative for the nominal data, anomalous data points are expected to deviate from the nominal submanifold and hence
the magnitude of the residual term, i.e., ‖rt‖2, is expected to take higher values for anomalous data compared to nominal data.
Hence, the magnitude of the residual term can be used as a summary statistic to distinguish anomalous data. Given a nominal
dataset X , let S1 and S2 be two subsets of X , i.e., S1,S2 ⊂ X , with sizes N1 and N2, respectively, where N1, N2 ≤ N .
Firstly, using S1, we can determine a representative submanifold that the nominal data are embedded in. Then, using S2, we
can compute the magnitude of the residual terms, i.e., {‖rj‖2 : xj ∈ S2}, that can be used as a set of nominal summary
statistics.
There are various methods to determine the underlying submanifold of the observed high-dimensional data streams, among
which the PCA is a well known method for finding a linear submanifold, called the principal subspace [30, Sec. 12.1]. Next,
we explain the PCA and the PCA-based summary statistics.
The PCA is a nonparametric linear submanifold learning technique as it is computed directly from a given dataset without
requiring any data model. Given a set of nominal data points S1, the PCA provides a linear subspace with dimensionality
r ≤ p such that (i) the variance of the projected data onto the r-dimensional subspace is maximized and (ii) the sum of squares
of the projection errors (residual magnitudes) is minimized [30, Sec. 12.1].
9In the PCA method, denoting x¯ as the sample mean, i.e.,
x¯ , 1
N1
∑
xi∈S1
xi (7)
and Q as the sample data covariance matrix, i.e.,
Q , 1
N1
∑
xi∈S1
(xi − x¯)(xi − x¯)T, (8)
firstly, the eigenvalues {λj : j = 1, 2, . . . , p} and the eigenvectors {vj : j = 1, 2, . . . , p} of Q are computed, where
Qvj = λjvj , j = 1, 2, . . . , p.
Then, the dimensionality of the submanifold, r, can be determined based on the desired fraction of data variance retained in
the submanifold, given by
γ ,
∑r
j=1 λj∑p
j=1 λj
≤ 1, (9)
where the r-dimensional principal subspace is spanned by the orthonormal eigenvectors v1, v2, . . . , vr corresponding to the
r largest eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . , λr of Q. Let V , [v1,v2, . . .vr]. The representation of xt in the linear submanifold can
then be determined as follows:
yt = x¯+
r∑
j=1
vjv
T
j (xt − x¯)
= x¯+VVT(xt − x¯). (10)
Then, the residual term can be computed as
rt = xt − yt
= (Ip −VVT)(xt − x¯), (11)
where Ip ∈ Rp×p is an identity matrix.
To obtain the PCA-based nominal summary statistics, firstly, using S1, we can compute Q based on (8), and then its
eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Then, for a chosen γ (see (9)), we can determine r and the corresponding V. Finally, using S2
and (11), we can compute {‖rj‖2 : xj ∈ S2}, that forms a set of nominal PCA-based summary statistics.
Note that although here we have only focused on the PCA and the linear submanifolds, using the same data model in
(6) and following a similar methodology, summary statistics can be extracted for any (possibly nonlinear) manifold learning
algorithm as long as it is appropriate for the observed high-dimensional data stream and it allows for efficient computation
of the residual terms rt (see (6)) both for a given nominal dataset and also for the sequentially acquired out-of-sample data,
without re-running the manifold learning algorithm.
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IV. REAL-TIME NONPARAMETRIC ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Proposed Algorithm
We firstly discuss the statistical outlier detection based on a set of nominal summary statistics. Notice that for outliers, both
of the proposed summary statistics, dt and ‖rt‖2, take higher values compared to non-outliers (see Sec. III). Hence, outliers in
fact correspond to the right tail events based on the nominal pdf of the summary statistics. Let us specifically consider dt. In
case the knowledge of the nominal pdf of dt, i.e., fd0 , is available, we would compute the corresponding right tail probability
as follows:
pt =
∫ ∞
dt
fd0 (z)dz = 1− F d0 (dt), (12)
where F d0 is the cdf of dt. If pt < α, we can then consider dt (correspondingly xt) as an outlier with respect to the significance
level α.
In our problem, although we do not have the knowledge of fd0 (and F
d
0 ), using a set of i.i.d. realizations of the nominal
summary statistics, we can obtain an edf that estimates F d0 . Let {dj : xj ∈ S2} be the set of nominal summary statistics. Then,
the corresponding edf is given by
Fˆ d0,N2(z) ,
1
N2
∑
xj∈S2
11{dj ≤ z}. (13)
Moreover, by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, Fˆ d0,N2 pointwise almost surely converges to the actual cdf F
d
0 as N2 →∞ [31].
Then, we can estimate pt based on Fˆ d0,N2 as follows:
pˆt = 1− Fˆ d0,N2(dt)
=
1
N2
∑
xj∈S2
11{dj > dt}. (14)
That is, pˆt is simply the fraction of the nominal summary statistics {dj : xj ∈ S2} greater than dt. If pˆt < α, then we can
consider xt as an outlier with respect to the level of α.
Let
sˆt , log
(
α
pˆt
)
. (15)
Notice that for an outlier xt with respect to a level of α, we have sˆt > 0 and similarly, for a non-outlier xt, we have sˆt ≤ 0.
Then, by replacing sˆt with st in (4), we propose the following model-free CUSUM-like anomaly detection algorithm:
Γ = inf{t : gt ≥ h},
gt = max{0, gt−1 + sˆt}, (16)
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Algorithm 1 GEM-based Real-time Nonparametric Anomaly Detection
Offline Phase
1: Uniformly randomly partition the nominal dataset X into two subsets S1 and S2 with sizes N1 and N2, respectively.
2: for j : xj ∈ S2 do
3: Search for the kNNs of xj among the set S1.
4: Compute dj using (5).
5: end for
Online Detection Phase
1: Initialization: t← 0, g0 ← 0.
2: while gt < h do
3: t← t+ 1.
4: Obtain the new data point xt.
5: Search for the kNNs of xt among the set S1 and compute dt using (5).
6: pˆt = 1N2
∑
xj∈S2 1 {dj > dt}.
7: sˆt = log(α/pˆt).
8: gt ← max{0, gt−1 + sˆt}.
9: end while
10: Declare an anomaly and stop the procedure.
Algorithm 2 PCA-based Real-time Nonparametric Anomaly Detection
Offline Phase
1: Choose subsets S1 and S2 of X with sizes N1 and N2, respectively.
2: Compute x¯ and Q over S1 using (7) and (8), respectively.
3: Compute the eigenvalues {λj : j = 1, 2, . . . , p} and the eigenvectors {vj : j = 1, 2, . . . , p} of Q.
4: Based on a desired level of γ (see (9)), determine r and form the matrix V = [v1,v2, . . .vr].
5: for j : xj ∈ S2 do
6: rj = (Ip −VVT)(xj − x¯).
7: Compute ‖rj‖2.
8: end for
Online Detection Phase
1: Initialization: t← 0, g0 ← 0.
2: while gt < h do
3: t← t+ 1.
4: Obtain the new data point xt.
5: rt = (Ip −VVT)(xt − x¯) and compute ‖rt‖2.
6: pˆt = 1N2
∑
xj∈S2 1 {‖rj‖2 > ‖rt‖2}.
7: sˆt = log(α/pˆt).
8: gt ← max{0, gt−1 + sˆt}.
9: end while
10: Declare an anomaly and stop the procedure.
where g0 = 01. Since we model anomalies as persistent outliers, the decision statistic gt has a positive drift in case of an
anomaly and a non-positive drift in the absence of anomalies.
We summarize the proposed GEM-based and PCA-based detection schemes in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. Moreover,
we present a diagram of the proposed schemes in Fig. 1. The proposed schemes consist of an offline phase for extracting the
baseline statistics for a given set of nominal data points and an online phase for anomaly detection. The offline phases are
explained in Sec. III. In the online phase, at each time t, a new data point xt is observed and using the baseline statistics, the
summary statistic corresponding to xt is computed and then the tail probability pˆt and the statistical evidence sˆt are estimated.
The decision statistic gt is then updated and if it exceeds the predetermined decision threshold h, an anomaly is declared,
1In case where
∑
xj∈S2 11{dj > dt} = 0, we have pˆt = 0 (see (14)), and hence gt = ∞. In this case, a small nonzero value, e.g., 1/N2, can be
assigned to pˆt in order to prevent the decision statistic to raise to infinity due to a single outlier. This modification can be useful to reduce the false alarm
rate especially in the small-sample settings (small N2).
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Obtain the new data point xt
Compute the summary statistic
Compute the tail probability p^t and s^t = log(α=p^t)
Update the decision statistic: gt  (gt−1 + s^t)
+
gt ≥ h
t t+ 1Declare an anomaly
0 ≤ gt < h
Online Phase
Offline Phase
A set of nominal data points:
X = fxi : i = 1; 2; : : : ; Ng
Baseline statistics
Fig. 1: Diagram of the proposed detection schemes.
otherwise the algorithm proceeds to the next time interval and acquires a further observation. Note that the proposed detection
mechanism is generic in the sense that after extracting useful summary statistics for nominal data and computing an edf for the
nominal summary statistics, the proposed CUSUM-like algorithm in (16) can be employed for real-time anomaly detection.
B. Analysis
During normal system operation (no anomaly), if the decision statistic gt exceeds the test threshold h, then a false alarm
occurs. In anomaly detection, false alarm is an undesired event and for reliability of an anomaly detection scheme, performance
guarantees regarding the false alarm rate are often desirable. With this purpose, firstly the following theorem provides an
asymptotic upper bound on the level of α such that in the absence of anomalies, the decision statistic gt (almost surely) does
not diverge in the mean squared sense.
Theorem 1: In the absence of anomalies, i.e., for t < τ , if α < 1/e, where e denotes the Euler’s number, we have as
N2 →∞,
P
(
sup
t≥0
E
[
g2t | g0 = 0
]
<∞
)
= 1,
i.e., the decision statistic does not grow unbounded in the mean squared sense, with the probability 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 provides a guidance to choose the level of α. Specifically, α can be chosen smaller than 1/e to asymptotically
ensure that the decision statistic of the proposed algorithm stays finite over time under normal operating conditions, that
eliminates false alarms due to the divergence of the decision statistic.
In the proposed CUSUM-like algorithm given in (16), the decision statistic at time t, i.e., gt, is determined by {sˆn : n ≤ t}
where sˆn’s are i.i.d. over time in the absence of anomalies. Hence, we have actually a random walk driven by {sˆn} with lower
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threshold 0 and upper (decision) threshold h and our aim is to determine the average false alarm period, i.e., the first time,
on the average, the upper threshold h is crossed in the no-anomaly case. In the literature, this problem has been considered
in several studies and some approximations and bounds are provided for this quantity as the exact computation is analytically
intractable [5, Sec. 5.2.2], [32]–[35]. To be able to provide a performance guarantee regarding the false alarm rate, we prefer
to derive a lower bound on the average false alarm period based on [5, Sec. 5.2.2.4]. The following theorem provides an
asymptotic lower bound on the average false alarm period of the proposed algorithm for chosen values of α and h.
Theorem 2: For chosen α < 1/e and h > 0, the average false alarm period of the proposed anomaly detection algorithm,
E∞[Γ], asymptotically (as N2 →∞) achieves the following lower bound:
E∞[Γ] ≥ e(1−θ)h, (17)
where 0 < θ < 1 is given by
θ =
W (α log(α))
log(α)
, (18)
where W (c) is the Lambert-W function2 that provides solutions z to the equation
z ez = c.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 2, α and h can be chosen to asymptotically satisfy the minimum acceptable level of the average false
alarm period. Specifically, if the desired (asymptotic) minimum average false alarm period is L > 0, then
E∞[Γ] ≥ e(1−θ)h ≥ L,
which is equivalent to
h ≥ log(L)
1−W (α log(α))/log(α) ,
that presents a lower bound on the test threshold h for a chosen level of α. As an example, for L = 106, Fig. 2 illustrates the
lower bound on h for α < 1/e.
Note that lower α and/or higher h lead to larger false alarm periods and also larger detection delays. This is because lower
α results in lower sˆt and hence lower gt, that increases the stopping time Γ (see (15) and (16)). Similarly, higher h results in
larger stopping time (see (16)). Hence, α and h are essentially tradeoff parameters that can be used to strike a desired balance
between the false alarm rate and the detection delays of the proposed algorithm. However, since the post-change (anomalous)
case is totally unknown and no anomalous data is available, it seems difficult to provide theoretical results regarding the average
detection delay of the proposed algorithm. Nonetheless, we know that as the discrepancy, e.g., the KL divergence, between the
2There is a built-in MATLAB function lambertw.
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Fig. 2: The lower bound (dashed curve) on the decision threshold h of the proposed algorithm for α < 1/e such that
E∞[Γ] ≥ 106 as N2 →∞.
nominal and anomalous pdfs increases, it is likely to observe more significant outliers after anomaly happens, that increases
sˆt (see (14) and (15)) for t ≥ τ , which in turn decreases the detection delays (see (16)).
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed real-time anomaly detection schemes using both synthetic and
real application data. In particular, we evaluate the GEM-based scheme in detection of cyber-attacks targeting the smart grid.
Moreover, we evaluate both the GEM-based and the PCA-based schemes in detection of changes in human physical activity
and botnet attacks in an IoT network. Throughout the section, we choose α = 0.1 and obtain the tradeoff curves between the
average detection delay and the average false alarm period by varying the test threshold h. In computing the detection delays,
we assume that anomalies happen at τ = 1, that corresponds to the worst-case detection delay for the proposed algorithm
since the decision statistic gt is equal to zero just before the anomalies happen (recall that g0 = 0). In the following, we firstly
briefly explain the benchmark algorithms and then present the application setups along with the corresponding performance
curves.
A. Benchmark Algorithms
1) Nonparametric CUSUM Test: In cases where the univariate test statistic is expected to take higher values in the post-
change case compared to the pre-change case, a nonparametric CUSUM test can be used for change detection, where the
difference between the test statistic and its mean value in the pre-change case is accumulated over time and a change is
declared if the accumulated statistic exceeds a predetermined threshold. For instance, the chi-squared statistic [32] and the
magnitude of the innovation sequence in the Kalman filter [36] are expected to increase in case of an anomaly and several
variants of the nonparametric CUSUM detector have been proposed in the context of anomaly/attack detection in the smart
grid [32], [36].
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In our case, both summary statistics, i.e., dt and ‖rt‖2, are expected to increase in case of an anomaly compared to their
nominal mean values. Hence, after obtaining a set of nominal summary statistics, we can compute the empirical mean of them
and then apply the nonparametric CUSUM test for real-time anomaly detection. Let us specifically consider dt and let
d¯ , 1
N2
∑
xj∈S2
dj
denote the empirical nominal mean of dt. Then, the nonparametric CUSUM test is given by
Γ¯ = inf{t : g¯t ≥ h¯},
g¯t = max{0, g¯t−1 + dt − d¯},
where g¯0 = 0 and Γ¯, g¯t, and h¯ denote the stopping time, the decision statistic at time t, and the test threshold, respectively.
The nonparametric CUSUM test requires storing only the nominal mean of the summary statistics. Hence, in terms of
storage cost, it is advantageous compared to our proposed CUSUM-like detection schemes, that make use of the entire set of
nominal summary statistics computed in an offline phase. On the other hand, using only the nominal mean statistic reduces the
performance of the nonparametric CUSUM test compared to our proposed detectors, as illustrated in the following subsections.
In each simulation setup presented below, we firstly compute the empirical mean of the nominal summary statistics (either for
dt or ‖rt‖2) and then obtain the performance curves for the nonparametric CUSUM test by varying its decision threshold h¯.
2) Information Theoretic Multivariate Change Detection (ITMCD) Algorithm: The ITMCD algorithm presented in [23] is a
sequential nonparametric change detection algorithm for multivariate data streams. In particular, it is a two sample test based
on the KL divergence between the multivariate distributions corresponding to two consecutive (over time) sliding windows of
observations. The KL divergence is estimated in a nonparametric way based on the distances of observations to their NNs both
within a window and between the windows.
Let Xt,w1 and Xt,w2 denote the most recent consecutive sliding windows of observations at time t with sizes w1 and w2,
respectively. That is, at time t, we have Xt,w1 = {xt−w1+1, . . . ,xt} and Xt,w2 = {xt−w1−w2+1, . . . ,xt−w1}. Moreover, let
em,n(i) denote the Euclidean distance between xi ∈ Xt,wm and its kth NN among the set Xt,wn , where m,n ∈ {1, 2}. The
KL divergence between the multivariate distributions corresponding to Xt,wm and Xt,wn is estimated as follows [23], [37]:
KLt,m,n , log
(
wn
wm − 1
)
+
p
wm
∑
xi∈Xt,wm
log
(
em,n(i)
em,m(i)
)
,
where xt ∈ Rp. The ITMCD algorithm is then given by
Γ˜ = inf{t : KLt,1,2 + KLt,2,1 ≥ h˜},
where Γ˜ and h˜ denote the stopping time and the test threshold, respectively.
The ITMCD algorithm is based on the fact that the discrepancy between the multivariate distributions increases in case of
a change/anomaly. Particularly, after an anomaly, since the window Xt,w1 includes recently acquired anomalous observations
before Xt,w2 , the distribution of the observations in Xt,w1 changes while the observations in Xt,w2 still have the nominal
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distribution for some time period. Then, the KL divergence between the two windows of observations increases compared to
the case where the both windows have the same nominal distribution. Note that the ITMCD algorithm requires, after obtaining
each new observation, repeating the search for the kth NN for each data point within both its own window and the other window.
This is computationally intensive for an online algorithm. Further, the window-based approach reduces the time resolution and
induces an inherent detection latency. Throughout the section, for the ITMCD algorithm, we choose k = 4 and the window
sizes as w1 = 20 and w2 = 100. Moreover. we obtain the corresponding performance curves by varying the test threshold h˜.
B. Real-Time Cyber-Attack Detection in Smart Grid
We consider the IEEE-57 bus power system that consists of 57 buses and 80 smart meters. Let φt ∈ R57 denote the voltage
angles (phases) of the buses and xt ∈ R80 denote the measurement vector collected through the smart meters at time t. Suppose
that the smart grid is operating according to the following commonly employed linearized DC model [38]:
xt = Hφt +ωt, (19)
where H ∈ R80×57 is the measurement matrix determined based on the power network topology and ωt ∈ R80 is the
measurement noise vector. Moreover, let
ωt ∼ N (080, σ2I80), (20)
where 080 ∈ R80 consists of all zeros and σ2 denotes the noise variance for each measurement. We simulate the DC optimal
power flow for case-57 using MATPOWER [39] and obtain the nominal voltage angles φt. Since we consider a steady-state,
i.e., static, power system model, we expect that the voltage angles stay nearly the same in the absence of anomalies.
Notice that (19) defines the normal system operation. However, in case of an anomaly, e.g., a cyber-attack, the measurement
model in (19) no longer holds. For instance, in case of a false data injection (FDI) attack launched at time τ , the measurement
vector takes the following form:
xt = Hφt + at +ωt, t ≥ τ, (21)
where at , [at,1, at,2, . . . , at,80]T is the injected malicious data at time t. Furthermore, in case of a jamming attack with
additive noise, the measurement vector can be written as
xt = Hφt +ωt + jt, t ≥ τ, (22)
where jt is the jamming noise that corrupts the meter measurements at time t. We aim to detect both FDI and jamming attacks
targeting the smart grid.
Based on (19) and (20), we have
xt ∼ N (Hφt, σ2I80), (23)
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Fig. 3: GEM-based nominal summary statistics for the IEEE-57 bus power system.
i.e., the nominal data covariance matrix is diagonal and every dimension has equal variance. If we collect a set of nominal data
points and perform the PCA, we can observe that every dimension is equally important so that the observed high-dimensional
nominal data do not exhibit a low intrinsic dimensionality. Nevertheless, we can still use our proposed GEM-based detector
(see Algorithm 1).
In this setup, we generate synthetic data based on the system and attack models presented above. Specifically, during the
normal system operation given by (23), we assume σ2 = 10−2 and acquire N = 105 nominal data points, and then uniformly
partition them into two parts S1 and S2 with sizes N1 = 2× 103 and N2 = 9.8× 104, respectively. We choose k = 4 and for
each data point xj ∈ S2, we compute dj , the sum of distances of xj to its first k NNs among S1 (see (5)). Then, we obtain
the histogram of {dj : xj ∈ S2}, as given in Fig. 3.
In case of an FDI attack (see (21)), we assume that at,i ∼ U [−0.14, 0.14],∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 80},∀t ≥ τ where U [ρ1, ρ2]
denotes a uniform random variable that takes values in the range of [ρ1, ρ2]. We present the corresponding performance curve
in Fig. 4. Note that the detection delays critically depend on the attack magnitudes. Specifically, if higher attack magnitudes
are used, then detection delays become smaller. Further, to illustrate how the proposed algorithm works, we present a sample
path of decision statistics over time in Fig. 5. Here, the FDI attack is launched at τ = 200, and we observe that after the
attack is launched, the decision statistic increases and exceeds the test threshold h, illustrated with a red dashed line. Finally,
in case of a jamming attack (see (22)), we assume that jt ∼ N (080, σ22 I80),∀t ≥ τ and present the corresponding performance
curve in Fig. 6. In detection of both FDI and jamming attacks, we observe via Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 that the proposed algorithm
outperforms the benchmark algorithms.
C. Real-Time Detection of Changes in Human Physical Activity
The Human Activities and Postural Transitions (HAPT) dataset [40] obtained from the UCI Machine Learning Repository
[41] contain data for six physical activities: sitting, standing, laying, walking, walking upstairs, and walking downstairs. The
first three, i.e., sitting, standing, and laying, are static and the remaining three are dynamic activities. We divide the given
dataset into two parts based on the given activity labels such that the first part of the dataset contains data for static activities
and the second part contains data for dynamic activities. Our goal is to timely and reliably detect changes from a static to a
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Fig. 4: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period in detection of an FDI attack against the smart grid.
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Fig. 5: Sample path of the decision statistic where the FDI attack is launched at τ = 200.
dynamic activity where each data point is 561-dimensional. We hence consider the static activities as the pre-change (nominal)
state and the dynamic activities as the post-change (anomalous) state. Although there are finite number of data points in the
given dataset, we assume that at each time we sequentially observe a new data point. Particularly, up to the change-point τ , at
each time, we observe a data point chosen uniformly among the set of data points corresponding to static activities and after
the change-point, at each time, we observe a data point chosen uniformly from the set of dynamic activities.
We firstly uniformly select 2500 data points from the set of data points corresponding to static activities and using the
PCA method (see Algorithm 2), we obtain the eigenvalues of the corresponding sample data covariance matrix, as shown in
descending order in Fig. 7. We observe through Fig. 7 that the nominal data exhibit a low intrinsic dimensionality. We then
choose the minimum desired γ as 0.99. Accordingly, we choose r = 115 and retain approximately γ = 0.9903 fraction of the
data variance in the 115-dimensional principal subspace. Then, for the entire set of static activities (S2 = X ), we compute the
PCA-based nominal summary statistics that form the histogram shown in Fig. 8. Fig. 9 illustrates the superior performance
of the proposed PCA-based nonparametric detection scheme over the benchmark algorithms in detection of a change from a
static to a dynamic activity.
In cases where the observed data stream exhibits a low intrinsic dimensionality, another approach is applying the proposed
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Fig. 6: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period in detection of a jamming attack against the smart grid.
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Fig. 7: Eigenvalues of the sample data covariance matrix for a representative set of static activities in the HAPT dataset.
GEM-based detection scheme (Algorithm 1) after dimensionality reduction. That is, after obtaining the matrix V as described
in Algorithm 2, each data point in the nominal training set, xi ∈ X , and also each sequentially available data point, xt,
can be projected onto a r-dimensional space as VTxi and VTxt, respectively. Algorithm 1 can then be employed over the
low-dimensional space, which is computationally more efficient compared to employing Algorithm 1 over the original data
space. Fig. 9 illustrates the performance of the proposed GEM-based detection scheme over the projected data, where we
obtain the projection matrix V as described above and uniformly choose S1 and S2 (in Algorithm 1) with sizes N1 = 1000
and N2 = 4738, respectively. We use an asterisk for Algorithm 1 to emphasize that it is employed based on the projected
low-dimensional data. We observe that Algorithm 1 outperforms the benchmark tests and shows a comparable performance to
Algorithm 2.
D. Real-Time Detection of IoT Botnet Attacks
Data for network-based detection of IoT botnet attacks (N-BaIoT) [42] obtained from the UCI Machine Learning Repository
[41] contain network traffic statistics for an IoT network under both normal and attack conditions, where the IoT network
consists of nine devices, namely a thermostat, a baby monitor, a webcam, two doorbells, and four security cameras and the IoT
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Fig. 8: PCA-based nominal summary statistics for static activities in the HAPT dataset.
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Fig. 9: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period for detecting changes in human physical activities.
devices are connected via Wi-Fi to several access points. In case of botnet attacks, attackers search for vulnerable devices in
the network and inject malwares to the vulnerable devices. Then, they take control of the compromised devices and use them
as a part of a bot network (botnet) to perform large-scale attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks over
the entire network [42]–[44]. In the N-BaIoT dataset, statistical features such as time intervals between packet arrivals, packet
sizes and counts are extracted from the real network traffic for each IoT device such that each data point is 115-dimensional.
For each device, the data are obtained under both normal operating conditions and several different attacks performed by
BASHLITE and Mirai botnets.
Timely and accurate detection of IoT botnet attacks has a critical importance to prevent further malware propagation over
the network, e.g., by disconnecting the compromised devices immediately after the detection. As an illustrative attack case,
we consider that the thermostat is compromised by the BASHLITE botnet and the compromised device is used to send spam
data to the other devices in the network [42]. Firstly, based on the PCA method summarized in Algorithm 2, 6500 data points
chosen uniformly among the nominal dataset are used to compute the sample data covariance matrix, where the corresponding
eigenvalues are presented in Fig. 10. We observe that the nominal data can be represented in a lower-dimensional linear
subspace and choosing r = 5, we retain nearly all the data variance in the 5-dimensional principal subspace, i.e., γ ≈ 1. Then,
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Fig. 10: Eigenvalues of the sample data covariance matrix for a representative set of nominal data points (thermostat) in the
N-BaIoT dataset.
Fig. 11: PCA-based nominal summary statistics for the nominal data (thermostat) in the N-BaIoT dataset.
using the entire nominal dataset, we compute the magnitudes of the residual terms, constituting the nominal summary statistics,
a histogram of which is presented in Fig. 11 where the frequencies are shown in the log-scale to have a better illustration.
We assume that before the attack launch time τ , at each time, we observe a nominal data point chosen uniformly among the
set of nominal data points and after the attack, at each time, we observe a data point chosen uniformly from the “junk” dataset
given for the thermostat [42]. The corresponding performance curve is given in Fig. 12. Similarly to the previous application
case, we employ Algorithm 1 using the projected r-dimensional data where we uniformly choose S1 and S2 in Algorithm 1
with sizes N1 = 1215 and N2 = 11896, respectively. In this setup, we observe that the nonparametric CUSUM test performs
considerably worse compared to the other detectors. This is due to some significant outliers in the nominal dataset. Particularly,
we observe through Fig. 11 that the baseline summary statistics mostly lie on an interval of smaller values, i.e., the majority of
the nominal data points fit well to the principal subspace. On the other hand, we also observe that for some nominal data points,
the summary statistics take significantly high values, that dramatically increase the empirical mean of the nominal summary
statistics. This, in turn, leads to higher detection delays for the nonparametric CUSUM test. Moreover, the significant outliers
among the nominal data points (with very large ‖rt‖2) also increase the false alarm rate of the nonparametric CUSUM test.
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Fig. 12: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period in detection of a spam attack launched by a BASHLITE botnet.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed nonparametric data-driven real-time anomaly detection schemes. The proposed schemes
are reliable, effective, scalable, and hence ideally suited for high-dimensional settings. Moreover, the proposed schemes are
widely applicable in a variety of settings as we do not make unrealistic data model assumptions. We have considered both
the special case where the observed data stream has a low intrinsic dimensionality and the general case. In both cases, we
have proposed to extract and process univariate summary statistics from the observed high-dimensional data streams, where
the summary statistics are useful to distinguish anomalous data from nominal data. We have proposed a low-complexity
CUSUM-like anomaly detection algorithm based on the extracted summary statistics. We have provided a sufficient condition
to asymptotically ensure that the decision statistic of the proposed algorithm does not grow unbounded in the absence of
anomalies. We have also provided a controllable asymptotic lower bound on the average false alarm period of the proposed
algorithm. Simulations with synthetic and real application data demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes in timely
and accurate detection of anomalies in a variety of high-dimensional settings.
In this study, we have studied stationary (i.i.d.) high-dimensional data streams. However, in practice, the observed data
stream might be non-stationary (non-i.i.d.) over time. In such cases, a common approach is assuming a slowly time-varying
submanifold underlying the observed data stream [9], [10], [45]. We can extend our results to this case where we can employ
a subspace tracking algorithm [46] to dynamically estimate the underlying submanifold and using a (sequentially acquired)
nominal dataset, for each nominal data point, we can compute the distance between the data point and its representation
in the estimated submanifold, that form a set of nominal summary statistics. Then, in the online anomaly detection phase,
the proposed CUSUM-like algorithm can be employed based on the extracted summary statistics to evaluate whether the
sequentially available data stream rapidly deviates from the nominal dynamic submanifold. Notice that for this approach to be
effective, we still need that the nominal summary statistics (the distance terms) have a stationary distribution over time.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Firstly, we derive the asymptotic distribution of sˆt (see (15)) in the absence of anomalies, i.e., for t < τ . By the
Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, the edf of the nominal summary statistics, i.e., Fˆ d0,N2 given in (13), converges to the cdf F
d
0 as
N2 →∞ [31]. Hence, pˆt in (14) converges to pt in (12) and equivalently sˆt converges to st in (3). The proposed CUSUM-like
detector in (16) thus converges to the algorithm in (4). It is well known that the cdf of any continuous random variable is
uniformly distributed U [0, 1] [47]. Then, we have
pt = 1− F d0 (dt) ∼ U [0, 1].
The cdf of st, t < τ , denoted with F st0 , is then given by
F st0 (y) = P(st ≤ y) = P
(
log
(
α
pt
)
≤ y
)
= P
(
pt ≥ α
ey
)
=

1− αey , if y > log(α)
0, otherwise.
Moreover, the pdf of st, t < τ , denoted with fst0 , is given as follows:
fst0 (y) =
∂F st0 (y)
∂y
=

α e−y, if y > log(α)
0, otherwise.
(24)
Then, based on (24), we have E[st] = 1 + log(α) and E[s2t ] = 1 + (1 + log(α))2.
From (4), we have gt = max{0, gt−1 + st}, that implies g2t ≤ (gt−1 + st)2. We can then write
E[g2t | gt−1] ≤ E[(gt−1 + st)2 | gt−1]
= g2t−1 + 2gt−1E[st] + E[s2t ]
= g2t−1 + 2gt−1(1 + log(α)) + 1 + (1 + log(α))
2. (25)
Next, we solve the following inequality:
g2t−1 + 2gt−1(1 + log(α)) + 1 + (1 + log(α))
2 ≤ g2t−1, (26)
which is equivalent to
−2gt−1(1 + log(α)) ≥ 1 + (1 + log(α))2. (27)
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Recalling that gt−1 ≥ 0 and since the RHS of (27) is positive, the solution to (27) is given as follows:
α < 1/e and gt−1 ≥ 1 + (1 + log(α))
2
−2(1 + log(α)) . (28)
Firstly, let α < 1/e and gt−1 ≥ f(α), where
f(α) , 1 + (1 + log(α))
2
−2(1 + log(α)) > 0.
Then, based on (25), (26), and (28), we have
E[g2t | gt−1] ≤ g2t−1. (29)
Moreover, since gt−1 ≥ f(α) > 0, we have
gt−1 = max{0, gt−2 + st−1} = gt−2 + st−1. (30)
Here, we can either have gt−2 < f(α) or gt−2 ≥ f(α). In the case where gt−2 < f(α) < ∞, since P(st−1 < ∞) = 1 (cf.
(24)), we have P(gt−1 <∞) = 1 (cf. (30)). Then, from (29),
P(E[g2t | gt−1] <∞) = 1. (31)
Note that
E
[
E[g2t | gt−1] | g0 = 0
]
= E[g2t | g0 = 0], (32)
where in the LHS of (32), the inner expectation is with respect to (wrt) gt | gt−1 and the outer expectation is wrt gt−1 | g0 = 0.
Moreover, in the RHS of (32), the expectation is wrt gt | g0 = 0. Then, based on (31) and (32), and since the expectation of a
finite variable is also finite, we have
P(E[g2t | g0 = 0] <∞) = 1. (33)
Further, in the case where gt−2 ≥ f(α), similar to (29), we have
E[g2t−1 | gt−2] ≤ g2t−2. (34)
Using nested expectations, (29), and (34), we can write
E[g2t | gt−2] = E
[
E[g2t | gt−1] | gt−2
]
≤ E[g2t−1 | gt−2] ≤ g2t−2.
Here, since gt−2 ≥ f(α) > 0, we have
gt−2 = max{0, gt−3 + st−2} = gt−3 + st−2.
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Again, there are two possibilities: we either have gt−3 < f(α) or gt−3 ≥ f(α) and as such the procedure repeats itself backward
in time. The conclusion is that if there exists ω ≤ t such that gt−ω < f(α), then we have P(E[g2t | g0 = 0] <∞) = 1. Since
g0 = 0 < f(α), there indeed exists at least one ω, which is ω = t, such that gt−ω < f(α). Then, in case where α < 1/e and
gt−1 ≥ f(α), we have P(E[g2t | g0 = 0] <∞) = 1.
Next, let α < 1/e and gt−1 < f(α). Since gt = max{0, gt−1 + st}, we either have gt = 0 or gt = gt−1 + st. If gt = 0, we
clearly have E[g2t | g0 = 0] = 0 <∞. On the other hand, if gt = gt−1 + st, we have
E[g2t | gt−1] = g2t−1 + 2gt−1E[st] + E[s2t ]
= g2t−1 + 2gt−1(1 + log(α)) + 1 + (1 + log(α))
2
< g2t−1 + 1 + (1 + log(α))
2 (35)
< f(α)2 + 1 + (1 + log(α))2 <∞, (36)
where (35) follows since gt−1(1 + log(α)) < 0 and (36) follows since gt−1 < f(α). Then, using nested expectations and the
fact that the expectation of a finite variable is finite, we obtain the following inequality:
E
[
E[g2t | gt−1] | g0 = 0
]
= E[g2t | g0 = 0] <∞,
that also implies
P(E
[
g2t | g0 = 0
]
<∞) = 1.
In conclusion, if α < 1/e, we have showed above that for both of the complementary conditions, namely gt−1 ≥ f(α) and
gt−1 < f(α), we have
P(E
[
g2t | g0 = 0
]
<∞) = 1. (37)
This implies that α < 1/e is a sufficient condition to obtain (37) asymptotically as N2 →∞.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. As discussed in Appendix A, as N2 → ∞, sˆt converges to st and hence the proposed CUSUM-like detector in (16)
converges to the algorithm in (4). Note that if α < 1/e, then E[st] = 1 + log(α) < 0. In [5, Sec. 5.2.2.4], for CUSUM-like
algorithms such as (4), a lower bound on the average false alarm period is then given as follows:
E∞[Γ] ≥ e−w0h,
where w0 < 0 is the solution to
E[e−w0st ] = 1. (38)
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Defining θ , w0 + 1, we can rewrite (38) based on the pdf of st (see (24)) as follows:
E[e−w0st ] =
∫ ∞
log(α)
e(1−θ)yαe−ydy
= α
∫ ∞
log(α)
e−θydy
= α
e−θ log(α)
θ
= 1, (39)
provided that θ > 0. The conditions w0 = θ − 1 < 0 and θ > 0 together lead to 0 < θ < 1. Moreover, we can rewrite (39) as
follows:
θ eθ log(α) = α,
and multiplying both sides by log(α), we have
θ log(α) eθ log(α) = α log(α). (40)
Now, define z , θ log(α) and c , α log(α) so that (40) can be rewritten as
z ez = c,
where z = W (c) = W (α log(α)). Then, we have
θ =
W (α log(α))
log(α)
.
Next, we show that there exists a unique solution to (39) by contradiction. Assume that there exists two solutions θ1 and
θ2 to (39) where θ1 6= θ2. Further, without loss of generality, assume θ2 < θ1. Then, we have 0 < θ2 < θ1 < 1. From (39),
we have
α
e−θ1 log(α)
θ1
= 1,
which implies that
log(θ1)
1− θ1 = log(α), (41)
and similarly,
log(θ2)
1− θ2 = log(α). (42)
Then, based on (41) and (42), we have
log(θ1)
1− θ1 =
log(θ2)
1− θ2 . (43)
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Furthermore, for 0 < θ < 1, we have
∂ log(θ)1−θ
∂θ
=
1/θ − 1 + log(θ)
(1− θ)2
=
µ− 1− log(µ)
(1− 1/µ)2 > 0, (44)
where µ , 1/θ > 1. The inequality in (44) follows due to the fact that log(µ) < µ− 1 for µ > 1. Then, since the first order
derivative of the function
log(θ)
1− θ
is positive, it is monotonically increasing in the range of 0 < θ < 1. Since 0 < θ2 < θ1 < 1, we then have
log(θ2)
1− θ2 <
log(θ1)
1− θ1 , (45)
which contradicts with (43). Hence, there exists a unique solution to (39).
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